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Abstract: 
Current labour markets are witnessing a proliferation of hybrid or quasi-employment 
status whereby company directors and limited liability partners are gaining access to 
employment rights. At the same time, legislation is creating new forms of employee 
shareholder status, where employees trade employment rights for shares in the 
company. New corporate structures are being developed to promote one man 
companies, SMEs and hybrid company/partnerships. 
This paper examines some of these developments in the light of the theory of the 
firm and the jurisprudence of company and employment law and considers the 
implications for workers, employers and the self-employed. 
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Introduction 
The context of the paper is a set of recent developments in both the organisation of 
the firm and employment status. The paper traces some of these developments by 
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identifying new forms of quasi -employment status or hybrids, which reflect some 
features of employment and some features of self-employment. 
 The paper addresses the theme of professional self -employment by examining 
ways in which some traditionally self -employed individuals are acquiring 
employment status. This may involve a reversal of roles in that some employees 
have become more entrepreneurial and at the same time some entrepreneurs have 
become more like employees. This osmosis of some of the central actors in the firm 
has important implications for the labour market. The changing status of both 
employee and entrepreneur requires a re-examination of the core constructs of both 
employment and company law. 
 The paper will focus on the inter-relationships between employees and 
entrepreneurs at the commercial periphery of the employment spectrum. What is the 
purpose and effect of new forms of quasi-employee status? Are these hybrid 
relationships a symptom or effect of changes in patterns of employment? The paper 
will also address changes in corporate structure which accommodate these 
relationships. 
The paper is structured in four main sections. The first part examines the essential 
characteristics of entrepreneurs and employees. The second examines the notion of 
the so-called ‘entreployee’ and provides a structure for the analysis of new hybrid 
types of employee. The third section looks at the notion of employee- owners and 
employee shareholders. The final section examines judicial approaches to the 
corporation and traces recent developments regarding the employment status of 
company directors and quasi-equity partners.  
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Part One: Entrepreneurs and Employees 
The central submission of this paper is that the employee relationship is changing 
into a more entrepreneurial type of relationship (Collins, 2001; Lazear, 2005). This 
section will therefore attempt to identify these two distinct types and then examine 
the new forms of hybridity relating to employees and entrepreneurs that have 
emerged in modern labour markets.  
Definitions of Employee and Entrepreneur  
A central problem that must be addressed at the outset is the issue of definition. 
First, there are no satisfactory definitions of either the term ‘employee’ or 
‘entrepreneur’. The term ‘employee’ is a legal term of art, which is central to the 
scope of employment law, as many employment rights are dependent on inclusion in 
the category of employee. However, there is no substantive definition of the term in 
statute in many common law systems, including the UK and Australia and the 
judiciary have been unable to provide a complete definition in one hundred and fifty 
years of case law. All we have at present is a loose factual matrix currently 
embodied in the so-called multi -factor methodology of Ready Mix Concrete v 
Minister of National Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497. The effect of 
this is not only that no clear boundary line exists between employment and self -
employment, but also that the definitional lack of clarity provides fertile ground for the 
gradual osmosis of new forms of ‘employment’ status which may result in real 
hybridisation of disparate and functionally different types of status. 
By contrast, the term ‘entrepreneur’ is not a legal term of art. Rather it is a 
description of particular forms of behaviour in the market. There is again no agreed 
definition of the concept. In particular, although innovation is an important aspect of 
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entrepreneurship, it is unclear whether innovation is a necessary element or whether 
self -employment or ownership of a firm are equally entrepreneurial (Licht, 2006).  
It is suggested that entrepreneurship has two main features: first, the creation of new 
economic opportunities, second, the introduction of an idea into the market in the 
face of uncertainty (Hamren, 2014). The following definition is provided by 
Henrekson (2007): 
A person can be said to engage in entrepreneurial venture if she either (1) 
perceives and creates new economic opportunities… new products, new 
production methods and new product market combinations and (2) introduces 
her or his idea in the market in the face of uncertainty by making decisions on 
location, form and the use of resources and institutions.  
The Basis of Employment Status 
The basic distinction between ‘dependent’ and ‘independent’ or ‘autonomous’ labour 
is central to all systems of labour law (Hepple, 1986; Burchell et al,1999; Freedland 
and Kountouris, 2008). 
Employment law poses a distinction between the employee who has a contract of 
service and the independent contractor who has a contract for services. This simple 
binary distinction poses self- employment as the default position, as all relationships 
that do not satisfy features of employment are automatically classified as ones of 
self- employment (Leighton and Wynn, 2011). Such a classification fails to recognise 
many types of person e.g. many freelancers and contractors who may be dependent 
on a single employer as employees and also falsely characterises many 
relationships exhibiting high degrees of risk and independence as employees 
(Leighton and Wynn, 2011; Freedland, 2003).  
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The aim of this paper is to focus on the entrepreneurial end of the spectrum of 
employment relationships (Wynn and Leighton, 2011). The entrepreneur is 
traditionally placed before the SME but after the dependent employee (see figure 1). 
 Self - Employment and Entrepreneurship 
Self -employment is a widely used measure of entrepreneurship, particularly in the 
economic literature (Parker, 2006).  Some of the research on entrepreneurship 
suggests that some self -employed individuals are not pure entrepreneurs because 
they are not innovators or arbitrageurs (Parker, 2006; Schumpeter, 1934). 
‘Dependent self-employed workers’ or those who depend on a single employer for 
work may also be excluded. 
If self- employment is not a necessary or sufficient condition of being an 
entrepreneur, then the possibility arises that some entrepreneurs (and even those 
who own their businesses) may claim to be employees in order to gain the benefits 
of employee status. Before considering the practical implications of this 
phenomenon, let us first examine some basic differences between the two 
categories of individuals 
Distinctions between Employees and Entrepreneurs 
In functional terms, employees may be distinguished from entrepreneurs on a 
number of essential dimensions. Here, I shall map out three areas of divergence, 
that of subordination/control, dependence/independence and risk. These dimensions 
have been chosen as illustrating those essential factors which a court may take into 
account in deciding whether an individual is an employee or not.  
The basis of employee status has been identified as the idea of ‘subordination to the 
capitalist enterprise’ (Hepple, 1986). Subordination or control is an inherent aspect of 
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the employment relation which arises from the need of the employer to direct labour. 
The master-servant model from which the contract of employment developed, was 
based on the employer’s powers of direction and discipline (Deakin and Morris, 
2012, Fox, 1974). This legal basis of the employment contract is also recognised in 
the economic theory emanating from Coase’s (1937) influential theory of the firm. 
The structural features of the employment contract were a necessary element of the 
governance structure of the firm. By contrast to the employee, the entrepreneur is 
often characterised as an individual who assumes control of resources including 
labour in order to maximise profit:  
The contract is one where the factor, for a certain remuneration …agrees to 
obey the directions of an entrepreneur within certain limits…if one contract is 
made for a longer period, instead of several shorter ones, then certain costs 
of making each contract will be avoided.  
Coase’s definition of an entrepreneur as the individual who founds a firm by directing 
labour, is a narrow definition. Not all entrepreneurs found firms or use labour in order 
to make profit. However, it is submitted that Coase’s distinction between directing 
and directed labour is important in economic and legal terms. 
The second aspect of the employee relationship crucial to employee status is the 
notion of dependence. An employee is dependent on an employer for the provision 
of work, whereas an entrepreneur is characterised by his or her ability to 
independently coordinate resources. The classic distinction is that between an 
employee who submits his labour to the enterprise in consideration of a wage, and 
the independent entrepreneur who chooses self -employment in order to sell his 
services to the market (Demsetz, 2011). The freelancer or contractor creates a 
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market for services or goods in order to make profits, whereas the employee relies 
on an employer to create a market for his labour (Aghion and Holden, 2011; Casson, 
2003). The result of this is that the employee becomes dependent on the employer 
for work, whereas the contractor finds a market himself.  
This distinction is further amplified by the phenomenon of firm start-up. An individual 
who decides to start up a firm in order to coordinate certain resources is exercising 
the entrepreneurial functions of direction and risk-taking. Management and risk- 
bearing are considered classic functions of the entrepreneur (Licht, 2007; Fama, 
1980). The decision to found a firm by opting to become self- employed involves an 
individual in a number of coordinating initiatives, each of which carries certain risks. 
The business man needs to set a price to the customer for services, advertise the 
product, advertise vacancies, fix wages and screen applicants (Casson, 2003). He 
must also build a reputation for quality. By contrast, the employee, after finding a job, 
relies on the employer to deal with products, customers and other factors of 
production (Casson, 2003).  
The third aspect is risk. The entrepreneur as the protagonist of economic activity 
calculates risk for profit (Licht, 2007; Hamren, 2014). The economic role of the 
entrepreneur involves bearing the risk of buying at certain prices and selling at 
uncertain prices (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990).  
Risk- taking has been assumed in the legal literature as a function which often 
distinguishes employment from self- employment. The economic test for employment 
status (Market Investigations Ltd v Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 QB 173) asks 
whether the worker is in business on his or her own account, as an entrepreneur, or 
works for another who takes the ultimate risk of loss or chance of profit (Deakin and 
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Morris, 2012, 162). Risk- taking can involve any or all of the normal factors of 
production, for example, ownership of tools, equipment and plant, arrangements 
made for tax, national insurance, VAT, statutory sick pay, degree of financial risk and 
responsibility for investment and management, number of assignments and risk of 
running bad debts and opportunity to work for other employers (O’ Kelly v 
Trusthouse Forte [1984] QB 90). Entrepreneurial activity, then is perhaps the 
clearest indicator, in legal terms, of self- employment and distinguishes economic 
risk- takers from employees who enter contracts of employment as an insurance 
against economic shock.  
Of course, employees as wage earners, cannot entirely insulate themselves against 
economic risk, as they risk dismissal for economic or other reasons. (Howe and 
Trebilcock (1993) Employees also make entrepreneurial decisions to leave firms and 
found their own businesses. The transition from employee to entrepreneur, however, 
indicates motivational factors based on risk-taking and profit-seeking which re-
emphasise the employee/entrepreneur distinction (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; 
Hvide, 2009).  
The distinguishing features of employees and entrepreneurs are summarised in 
figure 2. 
 
 
An objection to the model outlined so far is raised in the work of Schumpeter (1934) 
which makes a division between ownership and control of the firm. The entrepreneur 
is simply involved in ‘the carrying out of new combinations which we call “enterprise”. 
This narrow definition allows Schumpeter to include in the category of entrepreneur 
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not only ‘independent’ businessmen but also ‘dependent’ employees of a company 
such as managers or members of boards of directors. In addition, Schumpeter 
makes a distinction between ‘entrepreneurs’ and ‘capitalists’, allowing him to 
distinguish shareholders from entrepreneurs and to dispose of the conception of 
entrepreneurs as risk- bearers: 
Shareholders per se, however, are never entrepreneurs but mere capitalists, who in 
consideration of their submitting to certain risks participate in profits.   (Schumpeter, 
1934) 
This analysis of the entrepreneur has been highly influential in the development of 
corporate governance, allowing for the separation of the individual entrepreneur from 
the shareholding base in large corporations (Davies and Worthington, 2012). Small 
companies with controlling director shareholders are however in a different category. 
 
Part Two: The Merging of Employee and Entrepreneur Categories- A Modern 
Development? 
Let us now turn to the employee/entrepreneur dimension of the employment 
spectrum. I would like to illustrate this by reference to the emerging phenomenon of 
the so-called ‘entreployee’, a concept initially outlined by German sociologists G 
Voss and H. G Pongratz (Voss and Pongratz, 1998; Pongratz and Voss, 2003).  The 
authors theorise an ‘emerging self- entrepreneurial type of labour power’ as a 
response to demands for increased organisational flexibility. As Tayloristic methods 
of labour control inhibit workers’ motivation and innovation, organisations reduce 
direct control and encourage employees’ self- organisation. Labour power becomes 
commercialised as work capacity is intensified by the self -control of the employee. 
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This results in a new type: ‘The formerly passive employee is becoming, in the strict 
economic sense, the entrepreneur of his or her own potential, in the individual 
market economy’. (Pongratz and Voss, 2003) 
The word ‘entreployee’ combines the two terms, ‘entrepreneur’ and ‘employee’ 
(Hoge, 2011). It should be distinguished from ‘intrapreneurship’ which derives from 
the entrepreneurship literature (Antoncic and Hisrich, 2003). The focus of 
intrapreneurship is on how to increase organisational effectiveness and innovation, 
rather than focusing on historical changes in labour process (Hoge, 2011). There is 
however some convergence in the two concepts as intrapreneurship is one 
organisational strategy which encourages the development of new types of 
employees. To emphasise this coalescence, the term ‘entreployee’ is now commonly 
used in the business world to refer to strategies to develop internal talent by 
promoting the entrepreneurial skills of a particular workforce.  
I draw primarily on Pongratz and Voss’s sociological analysis in this paper, while 
recognising the relevance of the ‘intrapraneurship’ literature to the transformations in 
workplace participation.  
Phases of Labour Power 
Pongratz and Voss (2003) develop a schematic of historical types of labour power as 
an analytical tool to explain distinct phases in the development of industrial society 
(Braverman, 1974). The first phase – the so-called proletarian worker resulted from 
the transition from feudal conditions to factory labour. The second phase or 
vocational employee stage (from Ger. Beruf) corresponds to the Fordist production 
environment. The standard or ‘typical’ employee is to some extent a product of the 
modern welfare state, with complex social security and training systems (see Deakin 
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and Wilkinson, 2005). The typical employment contract represents a trade- off 
between provision of labour and protection from economic risk e.g. unemployment. 
The third phase sees the rise of entrepreneurial labour, involving commercialisation 
of labour capacity (the so-called ‘entreployee’).  
I would seek to develop this schematic of historical types of labour power by adding 
a fourth phase which I would define as the ‘colonisation’ of employee status by the 
entrepreneur. This phase is theorised as being empirically distinguishable from 
phase three in that here, the true entrepreneur, ‘colonises’ aspects of employee 
status in order to protect against economic risk. This phase is particularly prevalent 
in times of high financial instability (Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012), where the 
entrepreneur seeks to protect against economic shock by claiming the rights of 
employee status at the same time as benefiting from the privileges of incorporation. 
New forms of quasi-employment relationships are created to accommodate these 
changes. Some of these forms exhibit more aspects of the entrepreneur than that of 
the employee (see Figure 3: Historic Phases of Labour Power- the Emergence of the 
‘Entreployee’). 
It is submitted that the fourth phase is a natural development of the move towards 
entrepreneurialism in modern competitive labour markets (Collins, 2001; Carree and 
Thurik, 2003). In phase three, the enterprise modifies the employee type to further 
utilise the labour of the standard employee. In phase four, the enterprise itself 
changes shape and at the same time, transforms the legal nature of employee status 
in order to maintain competitiveness. 
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 It is this last phase which is the subject of this paper, which seeks to identify the 
judicial re-moulding of employee status to accord with the creation of new forms of 
corporate organisation. 
Entrepreneurship in Institutional Context 
The preceding section has provided a historical context for exploration of 
entrepreneurs as employees. This section will build on this by examining the 
institutional context in which entrepreneurship operates. 
The main proponent of the role of institutions for entrepreneurial behaviour is Baumol 
(1990). His analysis suggests that individual entrepreneurial effort may be used to 
circumvent institutions where it is beneficial to do so, with the result that predatory 
activities prevail over socially productive entrepreneurship (Henrekson, 2008). Given 
that the activities of entrepreneurs can be productive, unproductive or even 
destructive, we can analyse changes in the legal and institutional background to 
assess the total consequences of entrepreneurial behaviour. 
This paper builds on Henrekson’s model by examining the statutory and judicial 
context in which normative changes are taking place in the employee/entrepreneur 
framework. 
 
Part Three: Facilitating Entrepreneurial Employees - Employee Owners and 
Employee Shareholder Status  
One method of altering the traditional hierarchical basis of the employee relationship 
is to shift economic risk away from the employer and transfer it to the employee. The 
principle that the employer should assume responsibility for social and economic 
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risks arising from the employment relationship by means of social insurance (Deakin 
and Wilkinson, 2005) has begun to decline with the development of new 
entrepreneurial forms of employee status (Prassl, 2013). 
 Employee ownership as a mechanism of control has become common since the 
early 1970s, particularly in the United States (Lawrence French, 1987). The 
distribution of ownership rights across the workforce allegedly reduces alienation, 
stimulating productivity and legitimising managerial control (Garson, 1977). 
Employee share ownership has a potential for re-aligning interests between 
companies and employees by emphasising common interests and shared stakes 
(Pendleton, 2010). There is a considerable literature on the effects of employee 
ownership on employee attitudes and behaviour, most studies finding higher 
organisational commitment (Poole and Jenkins, 2013; Pendleton et al, 1998; Logue 
and Yates, 2001; Kruse, 2002). The employee ownership model tends to support the 
thesis of the entreployee as a category of employee involving commercialisation of 
the employment relationship in that the emphasis moves to economic objectives of 
firm and employee by promoting firm performance, improving workplace cooperation, 
information sharing and thus reducing labour management conflict (Kruse, 2002). 
As has been argued earlier in the paper, however, the divergence between the 
interests of employees and entrepreneurs may result in a conflict of interests. 
Shareholders and employees have different objective functions: shareholders are 
focused on equity value, whereas employees seek to maximise their own social 
interests including compensation, job security, private benefits and leisure (Kose et 
al, 2015). Strong labour rights may increase the bargaining power of employees and 
heighten employee-shareholder conflicts of interest (Kose et al, 2015). 
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In this context, it is of interest that the recent model of employee shareholder status 
introduced in the UK appears to be designed to weaken labour protection rather than 
promote the employee engagement as a stakeholder in the firm.  
The new s.205A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides: 
An employee shareholder agrees to have different employment rights to employees 
and receives fully paid up shares of a minimum value of £2,000 in the employing 
company.  
In return for this small parcel of shares, the employee shareholder forfeits major 
employment rights including general unfair dismissal rights, statutory redundancy 
payments and the right to flexible working. Such a trade-off may not be particularly 
attractive to standard employees despite the considerable tax incentives, however, 
the attractions to senior and managerial staff, where a stake in the company is 
deemed more beneficial than employment security are not inconsiderable.  
The UK scheme is based on the reduction of employee security in return for property 
rights, a much more controversial concept than that of the ESOP, the employee 
stock ownership plan, as developed in the US. The UK scheme has been 
characterised as potentially dismantling the contract of employment (Prassl, 2013). 
From the employee perspective, the renunciation of employment rights for a handful 
of shares is hardly a fair swap. Employees are being encouraged to share in the 
financial risk of the firm and become employee owners, but in order to do so, they 
sacrifice their traditional security rights as employees. A £2,000 stake in the firm as 
an offer to become ‘entrepreneurial’ seems small recompense for abandoning 
traditional employee status. 
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The UK model of employee shareholder is a reminder that employee ownership is a 
contingent concept. While there are benefits to employee shareholding, these 
benefits may not be realisable in financial or governance terms for employees. 
Typical shareholdings may not be large and are freely alienable. Many employee 
share plans in large, listed companies do not provide effective control rights and 
employee shares of total equity are usually relatively small (Pendleton, 2010). The 
concept of employees as stakeholders in the firm may hold out more promise than 
real benefits for employees. 
Part Four: Judicial Approaches to Entrepreneurs 
The paper has thus far discussed some of the difficulties of defining professional 
self-employment at the business, entrepreneurship end of the self-employment 
spectrum. We have traced a movement towards more entrepreneurial forms of 
employment and outlined so-called hybrid types in the form of the ‘entreployee’ 
concept. This final section examines judicial approaches to these new phenomena, 
by examining first, the relationship between the entrepreneur and the firm and 
secondly, new developments in the employment status of company directors and 
equity partners. The aim here is to illustrate, in legal terms, the possible development 
of a new phase of industrial labour types, the ‘colonisation’ of employee status by 
company directors.  
The Entrepreneur and the Firm: Saloman v Saloman  
The classic exemplar of the self- employed entrepreneur and his or her relationship 
to the firm is the UK House of Lords case of Saloman v Saloman [1897] A.C. 22. 
This case is chosen as it forms the basis of company law in common law 
jurisdictions and thus illustrates the method by which the jurisprudence of company 
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law structures capitalist relations. The case is also important as an example of the 
phenomenon of the so-called ‘one-man company’, a legal form which lends itself to 
the furthering of economic activity by solo entrepreneurs. 
Saloman was a trader who sold a solvent business to a limited company with a 
nominal capital of 40,000 shares of one pound each, the company consisting only of 
the vendor and six family nominees. The House of Lords held that Saloman was not 
personally liable to the creditors when the company was wound up as the company 
was a separate legal entity and the business belonged to the company, not to 
Saloman as its agent.  
The rule established in Saloman has enormous implications for the entrepreneur 
who wishes to found a firm to pursue a business venture, as incorporation enables 
the personification of the business so the entrepreneur’s liability for debts can be 
separated even though the entrepreneur retains control and reaps the profits. It has 
never been questioned whether the extension of legal privileges to small traders and 
investors is good legal or economic policy despite the warning given by Kahn Freund 
in 1944:  
However, owing to the ease with which companies can be formed in this 
country…ever since the calamitous decision in Saloman v Saloman, a single 
trader or a group of traders are almost tempted by the law to conduct their 
business in the form of a limited company, even where no particular business 
risk is involved, and where no outside capital is required.  
The potential for abuse is greater with small trading firms as incorporation can 
conceal the realities of trading relationships, allowing entrepreneurs to create shams 
and simulacrums  by assigning assets to companies and still acting as individuals 
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rather than as directors and shareholders (Kahn Freund, 1944; Wardman, 2012; 
Davies and Worthington, 2012). The legal fiction of separate personality can 
encourage the entrepreneur to set up a company with limited capital and defraud 
creditors (Davies and Worthington, 2012).Problems of delinquent entrepreneurs are 
increased in the case of private limited companies where there is limited publicity of 
financial status and no minimum capital requirements.  
Entrepreneurial Employees: Employment Status of Company Directors 
An important consequence of the doctrine of separate corporate personality is that it 
is jurisprudentially possible for a sole director of a one man company to be employed 
by the company and thus acquire employment status. Here the jurisprudence of 
company law is at odds with basic concepts of employment law, for as we have 
noted earlier, the basis of employment status is subordination. How can a company 
director both control the activities of a company and also be subject to the control of 
the company? In order to solve this legal conundrum, company law has resorted to 
the fiction of dual capacity as is seen in Lee v Lees Air Farming [1961] A.C. 12, 
which perhaps solves problems at the level of company law but does nothing to 
solve the acute problems left to employment law.     
Lee had formed a company in which he beneficially owned all the shares and 
appointed himself as sole governing director. He was chief pilot for the company and 
was killed in a flying accident. The company had insured against liability to pay 
compensation under the NZ Workmen’s Compensation Act. In order for his widow to 
claim that compensation, she had to prove that her deceased husband had been an 
employee of the company.  
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The Privy Council held that his position as sole governing director did not make it 
impossible for him to be a servant of the company in the capacity of chief pilot, for he 
and the company were distinct legal entities which could enter a valid contractual 
relationship. In effect, Lee, as governing director and agent for the company, could 
make a contract with himself in another capacity and give himself orders as servant 
of the company. As Davies and Worthington (2012) comment, ‘In effect the magic of 
corporate personality enabled him to be master and servant at the same time and to 
get all the advantages of both (and of limited liability)’. 
It should be noted here that the Court did not in this instance deem it necessary to 
inquire as whether the individual satisfied the normal tests which distinguish an 
employee (contract of service) from a self- employed person (contract for services) 
as Lee only needed ‘worker’ status for the purposes of statutory compensation. 
However, this decision sets the basis for 100 per cent employee shareholders to 
enter valid contracts of employment. 
At a policy level there are clearly issues as to whether the purposes of employment 
law are properly served in holding that majority shareholders should acquire access 
to employment rights .At a legal level, the concept of control has clearly been by-
passed by concepts of separate legal personality and dual capacity. The legal and 
policy issues will now be explored in more detail. 
Policy and the Purposes of Employment Law 
In the Lee case, there was a certain policy logic in allowing the claim as it was a 
claim for industrial compensation under a statutory insurance scheme covering 
benefits for dependants of employees of the company he had set up. Lee had paid 
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into this fund. It is a different matter where a shareholder director claims employment 
protection from national insurance funds when a business fails.  
Employment protection legislation is traditionally designed to provide severance 
compensation which provides a form of insurance against risks of unemployment as 
workers may not personally be able to afford to insure against such risks. Firms are 
better able to insure against fluctuations in income than workers are (Pissarides, 
2010). Termination of the relationship is a different matter for directors of companies, 
who are in a position to negotiate generous severance payments or ‘golden 
handshakes’ and can often negotiate their own terms of leaving (Cheffins, 1997) .  
The problem of abuse of employment protection legislation by shareholder directors 
was recognised by Mummery LJ in the UK case of Buchan v Secretary of State for 
Employment [1997] B.C.C. 145. Here a majority shareholder was held by the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal not to be an employee of the company for the 
purposes of claiming on state insurance funds on the insolvency of the company. 
The reason was that as a majority director and controlling shareholder he was able 
to block any decision by the board as to his own dismissal. The purposes of 
employment law would be undermined if such entrepreneurs running a business 
through the medium of a limited company were able to insulate against business 
risk: 
The context in which the issue of employee or non- employee arises under the Act is 
protection of employment. The purpose of the Act is to provide for state-funded 
compensation to be available for employees employed by those whose businesses 
have failed financially. It is not the purpose of those provisions to provide 
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compensation to an individual businessman or entrepreneur whose own 
incorporated business ventures have been unsuccessful.  (Mummery J) 
It is worth noting here that the legal position in private companies is that a director in 
a private firm may be able to defeat an attempt to remove him (under s.168 
Companies Act 2006) by inserting in the articles of association, a term to the effect 
that increases the votes to his shares on a resolution to remove him (Bushell v Faith 
[1970] A.C. 1099). 
Company Law and the Regulation of Small Companies 
The key question for this paper is to where the appropriate dividing line should be 
between the entrepreneur who incorporates a firm and controls that business and 
the manager who is still subject to the control of the firm. How far is it desirable to 
allow directors of companies to acquire employment status when they are able to 
exercise control over their own employment relationships? Should additional 
employment rights be accorded to directors who have the privilege of trading with 
limited liability or should those rights be qualified by requiring a degree of ‘outside’ 
control over the relationship (Wardman, 2003).  
Let us restate the issue in a different way. The structuring of the firm to enable the 
pursuit of risky capital ventures by separating ‘ownership’ of the company (the 
shareholding) from control of the firm by delegating management to a board of 
directors is a common feature of large firms. However, in small companies where 
owners and managers are often the same person, the corporate governance 
machinery which separates these roles may obstruct effective management (Davies 
and Worthington, 2012).  
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In UK law, the composition, structure and functions of the board of directors are left 
to a large degree to be decided by the company itself through its articles of 
association. In the case of a private company, one single director is sufficient (S. 154 
Companies Act, 2006) and many of the regulatory controls are relaxed, for example, 
no obligation to hold an AGM and shareholder decisions can be taken by a meeting 
of the members rather by written resolution.  
The import of this for small companies is that entrepreneurs may be able to operate 
largely informally and dispense with many of the safeguards against improper 
practice. The recent development of Limited Liability Partnerships increases the 
internal flexibility of governance. The spread of the ‘one-man’ company exacerbates 
these problems as ownership and control are then synonymous. The Company Law 
Review reported that 65 per cent of active companies have turnover of less than 
£250,000 and 70 per cent have only two shareholders and 90 percent fewer than 5 
shareholders. (Davies and Worthington, 2012) The Review decided that such ‘micro’ 
companies were best left without further regulation. 
The policy issue then is how far current ‘light touch’ regulation of the SME and the 
‘one- man company’ encourages forms of entrepreneurism which are not socially or 
economically beneficial.  
Company law has developed techniques to deny separate legal personality through 
the concept of ‘piercing the corporate veil’ and the doctrine of ‘sham’ or ‘simulacrum’. 
By lifting the corporate veil, the court is able to look behind the veil of incorporation to 
gain information about the nature, intention or motivation behind a particular act of 
the company (Wardman, 2003). Where the corporate structure is a mere façade 
concealing the true facts (Re Bugle Press [1961] Ch. 270), the court may ‘pierce the 
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veil of incorporation’ and treat the company as the alter ego of the controlling 
shareholder, that is treat them as one. However, in practice, the courts rarely lift the 
corporate veil (Deakin and Morris, 2012).  
Employment Status of Company Directors: Encouraging the 
Entrepreneur/Employee? 
In what ways does corporate governance enmesh with concepts of employment 
status? Is the truly independent entrepreneur a category that is treated differently for 
purposes of employment status?  
Against the background of Saloman and Lees, Morrison J stated  in Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry v Bottrill, [1997] IRLR 682 as follows: ‘There is nothing 
in the statute which says that ‘one-man companies’ fall into some kind of special 
category.’   
The willingness of the English judiciary to maintain flexibility in the application of the 
factual criteria for employment status has resulted in a mass of contradictory case 
law in the area of director shareholders.  
One area where the courts might inquire more closely into a claim that a controlling 
shareholder is also an employee of the company is in the area of insolvency or 
corporate restructuring (Deakin and Morris, 2012). However, even in this area, the 
last two decades have witnessed a gradual loosening of traditional criteria for 
employment status, particularly in the area of control.  It is submitted that this 
distortion has resulted in increasing acceptance of the entrepreneur as employee.  
Let us illustrate this proposition by a re-examination of the key employment tests of 
‘control’ and ‘entrepreneurial’ tests in the context of company directors. 
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 Control  
The current modern UK decision on the employment status of majority share-holders 
is the Court of Appeal decision in Secretary of State for Business Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform v Neufeld [2010] EWCA Civ. 280, where the Court re-asserted 
the primacy of company law orthodoxy as stated in Saloman and Lees. Neufeld was 
a 90 per cent shareholder and managing director of a small firm. He was a working 
director, was on the pay roll and paid tax and National Insurance. He had no written 
contract. He also gave personal guarantees and made a personal loan of £20,000 to 
the company. In view of the fact that he had risked his own capital, it was argued that 
he was running his own business as a manager. The Court of Appeal, however, held 
that he was an employee and allowed his claim against the National Insurance Fund 
on the insolvency of the company.  
Neufeld establishes that a majority shareholding in a company, even if it gives that 
person total control of the company, will not deny employee status to the individual 
entrepreneur. Thus a person with an economic interest in a company so that they 
own the company can still be an employee. What this means for control is spelt out 
by Rimer LJ in terms of ‘formal’ control and practical control. At the formal level, the 
control condition of an employment contract is dispensed with for majority 
shareholders. They cannot satisfy such a condition as the company and the putative 
employee are one and the same person. Practical control is also non- existent, as 
the individual has control over his own destiny, including the fact that he cannot be 
dismissed without his own consent (Neufeld, para 80). 
The result of this logic is that a court is bound to ignore the realities of control in the 
case of majority shareholders. Thus in the earlier case of Fleming v Secretary of 
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State for Trade and Industry [1997] IRLR 682, control was relegated to only ‘one of a 
number of relevant factors’ rather than being a ‘rule of law’. This down-grading was 
continued in Bottrill, where control became an ‘important’ rather than a ‘decisive’ 
factor, as in Buchan. Bottrill however, re-introduced a reality dimension to control. 
Bottrill had set up a business with two employees and one other director. He held the 
one share of the company which was issued i.e. a 100 per cent holding, but this was 
a temporary measure as it was intended that an American company, which supplied 
the products would become the majority shareholder in the future. Bottrill’s company 
became insolvent before the US Company made its investment, and Bottrill, who had 
a genuine signed contract of employment, was dismissed by the receiver and 
claimed redundancy. The Court of Appeal supported Bottrill’s claim. 
The new dimension of control introduced in Bottrill referred to the degree of control 
exercised by the company over the majority shareholder by other directors or 
shareholders. This is in effect control ‘in reverse’ – it is control by the company over 
the individual rather than control by the individual over the company (Howell, 
2008).This different test is in one sense, useful, as it allows the court to determine 
with more exactitude, whether the majority shareholder is subject to control of other 
directors. However, it also brings further practical difficulties. For example, there are 
different categories of directors, including non-executive directors. Secondly, 
shareholding does not necessarily correlate with numbers of votes. Weighted voting 
rights may be allowed in private companies attaching increased votes to a directors 
shares on a resolution to defeat him so that he can defeat such a resolution (Bushell 
v Faith [1970] AC 1099). Thirdly, in large companies with a diverse shareholding, 
effective control can be exercised with a decreasing proportion of votes, so that in 
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reality, where there is a diverse shareholding, a director may have more power than 
a director with a 50 per cent shareholding (Howell, 2000).  
A further modification of the principle of control is made in the later decision of 
Neufeld. Here the relevance of control is linked to the contract of the shareholder 
director. This reasoning transfers the focus of attention away from the power of the 
shareholder over the company’s decision making and towards the individual’s 
contractual relationship with the company. Rimer LJ states that director control over 
the company should not be a relevant factor where there is a genuine contract in 
writing. Instead, it is only relevant where there was no contract in writing so that it is 
necessary to ascertain the contents of the contract by examining conduct of the 
parties (Neufeld, Para 61). This approach distances the inquiry as to the nature of 
power in the company.  
 The result of this is that the concept of sham, traditionally used to control corporate 
abuses is used in Neufeld to scrutinise the contract, not to control abuse of the 
company form. The entire inquiry can then examine contractual behaviour (or lack of 
it) rather than the wider picture of company structures. The scope of inquiry is 
diminished to examining the conditions for formation and variation of contract and 
how the parties have conducted themselves under the contract (Neufeld, paras 83-
84).  This approach may be valuable in determining whether a particular director has 
acted as an entrepreneur or as an employee. For example, in the case of small 
companies, where matters are handled informally, the court will examine acts in the 
capacity as a director and distinguish those from acts in the capacity of employee 
such as whether an entrepreneur has been paid a salary (pointing towards 
employment) or by way of director’s fees (pointing to self- employment) (Neufeld, 
para 85). However, those entrepreneurial factors of control related to ownership of 
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capital are firmly removed from view. Thus, the amount of share capital invested, 
personal guarantee of company obligations, possibility of gaining on investment are 
stated to be irrelevant to employee status, as they only indicate an ‘owner acting as 
owner, which is inevitable in such a company’ (Rimer LJ, Neufeld, at para 86).  
The significance of the contractual approach developed in Neufeld is seen in a stark 
form in the recent case of Robert Stack v Ajar [2015] EWCA Civ 46. The Court in 
Neufeld had shewn awareness of the problem of the rogue entrepreneur in 
recognising that control, ownership and investment should still form ‘part of the 
backdrop of the inquiry’ (Neufeld, para 86) into employment status in cases of small 
companies and that a line needed to be drawn somewhere between the 
entrepreneur and the employee. However, contract was perhaps not the safest way 
to solve the problem.  
In Stack, an experienced entrepreneur was invited to invest in a newly formed 
company and became a director with two others, all owning equal shares. Only one 
director had a service contract and was paid a normal salary. Stack and the other 
director only received dividends. Stack never sought payment but his director’s loan 
account showed personal benefits of over £150,000. Stack never signed a contract 
of employment and indeed ran a number of his own businesses from premises he 
rented to the company. In these circumstances, it seems remarkable that when his 
appointment was terminated, he should claim unfair dismissal as an employee and 
unpaid wages. He was clearly a businessman, not an employee and had no contract 
to prove otherwise. Despite the fact that his was a purely commercial relationship, 
the Court of Appeal allowed his claim as an employee and managed to fashion a 
contract from pre-incorporation discussions between the three promoters of the 
company. Neufeld was not mentioned anywhere in the judgment. However, the 
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purely contractual analysis allowed a fictitious agreement to be constructed on the 
basis of unproven express terms and an implied term to pay wages on the basis of 
what reasonable businessmen would expect.  
The case of Stack is clearly wrongly decided. But more than this, the decision to 
allow this entrepreneur to claim employment rights indicates that the hybrid 
entrepreneur/employee category is very much alive and that the adventurer can turn 
into an employee when it suits the purpose of settling an argument with other co-
adventurers. The unscrupulous entrepreneur is encouraged in this process by a set 
of principles of company and employment law designed to facilitate business. All of 
Stack’s actions were more consistent with entrepreneurial activity than the acts of an 
employee. The small business environment encouraged by UK company law 
designed to promote enterprise and the modifications to the ‘control’ and 
‘entrepreneur’ tests in employment law enabled a businessmen to assign assets to a 
company to avoid personal liabilities, but then pursue employment claims when 
arguments arose.   
The Entrepreneur Test 
Stack indicates that in the context of company ‘start -up’ and ‘micro-business’, the 
fact that a businessman is acting in the capacity of an entrepreneur in building a 
business, is not inconsistent with employee status. In a non-business context, risk- 
taking is seen as the key pointer against employee status – the entrepreneurial test 
or ‘economic’ reality test established in Market Investigations Ltd v Minister of Social 
Security [1969] 1 All ER 241 has in fact denied employee status to many individuals 
who take financial risk but do not have an identifiable business of their own.  
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However, key entrepreneurial skills operating through the organisation of a company 
are promoted as is confirmed in Connolly v Sellars Arenascene Ltd [2001] ICR 760. 
Here an accomplished entrepreneur operated a number of businesses, some on a 
franchise basis and some as joint ventures under the umbrella of a company 
operating three divisions and a subsidiary. He was sole director and controlling 
shareholder and entered a contract of service with his companies. The tribunal found 
his service agreement was not a sham designed to put him in a favourable position 
in the event of insolvency and his claim for unfair dismissal was upheld. The Court of 
Appeal supported his claim on the policy basis of business promotion: 
If a person with the skills and success attributed by the tribunal to the 
respondent were qualities which prevented a person in his position from 
enjoying the status of employee, it would be a severe and unwarranted 
deterrent to business enterprise.  (Pill LJ, para 17) 
This ruling shows that employee status can be remoulded to suit business need and 
that employment law may be reconfigured to support failed businesses at key stages 
of the economic cycle. 
Evaluation and Conclusion 
This paper has identified a dichotomy in the traditional categorisation of employee 
status whereby elements of practice normally indicative of self- employment such as 
risk taking and an absence of control have been reversed in the context of the small 
business enterprise. An expanding category of ‘entreployee’ that emerges 
chameleon- like and changes colour in broad daylight has been charted both 
historically and by means of an examination of recent case law in a UK context. The 
cases presented are not an isolated instance, but indicative of a general trend 
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towards further commercialisation of the employment relationship (Wynn and 
Leighton, 2009; Walton, 2016). Rising trends in self -employment in the labour force 
are one reaction to competitive pressures in product and labour markets. The 
findings in this paper, however, indicate an opposing trend whereby individuals, 
traditionally regarded as independent and entrepreneurial, are actively pursuing the 
benefits of employee status, while at the same time acting as employers and 
business operators. 
It is argued that such trends may have adverse consequences in social and 
economic terms in that the State may become insurer in terms of insolvency 
payments for individuals who have already limited their liabilities for loss and have 
not contributed to social security systems through national insurance payments. 
A number of legal techniques can be employed to regulate more closely this 
category of entrepreneur/employee. Mummery LJ’s attempt in Buchan to block 
attempts by shareholder directors to gain employment rights might with hindsight 
appear to have been too crude in policy terms.  
A blanket exclusion of controlling shareholders from employment rights might deny 
some individuals who have insured by paying tax and national insurance by 
legitimately signing contracts of service with the company. Other cases have put 
forward controls on abusive entrepreneurial behaviour. In Clark v Clark Construction 
Initiatives Ltd [2008] IRLR 364, Elias P. suggested three instances where a court 
should not allow directors to gain employment status: first, where the company is 
itself a sham; second, where a contract is entered into for some ulterior purpose, for 
example in order to secure insolvency payments or to circumvent the rules on priority 
of creditors and third, where the parties’ conduct is not in accordance with the 
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contract (Clark, para 94). The current case law as exemplified by Neufeld and Stack 
has emphasised ground three and tended to ignore grounds one and two, with the 
result that more basic questions as to the legitimacy of a particular corporate form or 
opportunistic entrepreneurial behaviour have not always been fully explored.  
In particular, more attention might be focused on the company law doctrines of lifting 
the veil of incorporation. To return to Kahn Freund (1944): 
Is it tolerable that businessmen should be able to rid themselves of their 
liabilities, just because when assigning assets belonging to a company which 
is a “sham, simulacrum and a cloak” they fail to act as shareholders or 
directors rather than as individuals? 
By taking a contractual approach in recent director cases, the courts appear to have 
identified the issue incorrectly. The issue is not really the nature of the contractual 
relationship between the company and the individual but rather whether the 
company and the individual should be treated as two separate persons with capacity 
to enter a contract with each other (Tolmie, 1997). There is ample scope for taking 
up Kahn Freund’s admonition and inquiring more carefully as to how and when the 
courts should pierce the corporate veil, especially in the case of ‘one- man 
companies’ and ‘micro’ companies, where power lies in the hands of one or two 
directors (see the concept of ‘single economic unit’ in Adams v Cape Industries Plc 
[1990] Ch. 433). This would enable a more thorough scrutiny of the structural 
conditions whereby some types of entrepreneurs can osmose so easily into false 
types of employment status. In this way the chameleons would be returned to their 
original hues and not strut about so readily in the future.  
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Tables and Diagrams: 
Figure 1: The Spectrum of Employment Relationships (adapted from Leighton 
and Wynn, 2011) 
 
Standard Employee    Dependent worker Independent professional/Entrepreneur      SME 
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Employed <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< Self-Employed 
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Figure 2: Functions of Employees and Entrepreneurs 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Historic types of labour power in capitalism and the Emergence of 
the ‘Entreployee’  (adapted from Pongratz and Voss, 2003) 
Phase 1: Proletarian worker (early industrialisation) 
Raw working capacity 
Severe exploitation, no social protection 
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Phase 2: Vocational employee (Fordism)  
Structural technical and organisational control 
Developed Social security systems 
Phase 3: Entreployee (Post Fordism) 
Systematic self-control of work 
Self-exploitation, precarious social security 
Phase 4: Colonisation Phase 
Hybridisation of employee status 
Colonisation of social security aspects of employee status 
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